


















       RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, NEWARK WORKING PAPER #2009-005 
        
 
 
Abstract: Many firms cite financial constraints as some of the most important 
impediments to their investment and growth. Using a unique data set from the Czech 
Republic this paper investigates the importance of financing constraints in the context of 
exporters. It finds that exporters are less financially constrained than non-exporters. 
However, after carefully correcting for possible endogeneity and selection issues, the 
evidence points to less constrained firms self-selecting into exporting rather than 
exporting alleviating firms’ financial constraints. The analysis suggests that easing firms’ 
credit constraints may play an important role in facilitating exporting and that well-
developed financial markets that would decrease firms’ cost of external finance may be 
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Introduction 
 
Firms in developing countries and transition economies often cite financial 
constraints as one of the primary impediments to their investment and growth. The 
inability of firms to access outside credit hinders economic development, as recent papers 
illustrate. In an influential paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that by reducing the 
costs of external finance to firms, the development of the financial sector encourages 
economic growth. They find that industries which are relatively more in need of external 
finance grow faster in countries with more developed financial markets. Recent empirical 
papers also showed that countries with developed financial systems export relatively 
more in financially dependent sectors. Beck (2003) shows that financial sector 
development increases exports in industries that are more in need of external finance, 
while Becker and Greenberg (2005) find evidence of a positive relationship between 
higher financial development and higher exports, as access to funds help finance entry 
costs incurred by exporters. Manova (2008) provides support for this view by showing 
that countries with developed financial systems export relatively more in industries that 
are more in need of external funds and that have fewer collateralizable assets.  
 
However, at the firm level, there is relatively little empirical work analyzing the 
relationship between access to finance, liquidity constraints and exporting and the 
conclusions are mixed. Campa and Shaver (2002) use a panel of Spanish manufacturing 
firms to test for links between firms’ financial conditions and exporting. They find that 
cash flows are more stable for exporters than for non-exporters and that exporters’ 
investment is less sensitive to the internal cash flow than in the case of non-exporters.   3
However, they do not take into account endogeneity or selection issues. Guariglia and 
Mateut (2005) use UK data and analyze the sensitivities of firms' inventory investment to 
financial variables. The results suggest that foreign owned firms and UK exporters are 
less liquidity constraints than the rest of domestic firms. Greenway et al. (2007) focus on 
the financial health of UK exporters. They measure financial health by leverage and 
liquidity ratios and find that exporters enjoy better financial health than non exporters; 
however, they find no evidence that ex-ante financial health promotes exporting.  
 
The only theoretical contribution to this literature is Chaney (2005) who shows 
that if there are fixed costs associated with entry in foreign markets and if firms are 
constrained in their ability to finance these costs, only firms with enough ex-ante liquidity 
will be able to export. Even though there might be other firms that could profitably 
export, if they are short of enough liquidity they will not export. Nonetheless, he does not 
empirically test his predictions. 
 
 This paper investigates the importance of liquidity constraints in the context of 
exporters using unique survey and firm level data from a transition economy, the Czech 
Republic. In particular, we are interested to analyze whether exporting alleviates the 
liquidity constraints of domestic firms or whether, as Chaney (2005) conjectures, less 
constrained firms self-select into exporting. We differentiate between continuous 
exporters and starters and also account for other firms’ characteristics that may impact 
their access to external credit. We analyze the investment-cash flow sensitivities of 
exporters across a wide range of manufacturing industries that are more or less in need of 
external finances. Finally, we carefully correct for possible endogeneity in estimation as   4
well as for the self-selection of the less liquidity constrained firms into exporting. Our 
analysis is based on a unique data set collected by the World Bank through two surveys 
of 365 domestic firms in the Czech Republic, which allows us to identify exporting 
companies along with information about the timing of exporting, details regarding firm 
management, etc. The survey responses are supplemented with several years of data on 
firms’ balance sheets and profit and loss statements from the Amadeus database.
1 
 
How would selling in foreign markets affect firms’ financial constraints? There 
are several ways in which exporting may impact domestic firms’ dependence on internal 
funds. Exporters are likely to benefit from a diversification effect associated with selling 
in foreign markets whose business cycles are not perfectly correlated: these firms have 
more stable sales and cash flows, thus more easily financing long term investments. More 
stable cash flows makes it less likely that exporters default on their debt, thus increasing 
their creditworthiness in the eyes of the lending institutions and easing their access to 
external credit (Campa and Schaver, 2002). Exporters also tend to be larger, more 
productive, have larger cash flows and therefore may have an easier time getting access 
to external finance, or get preferential terms on their outside funds (Bernard and Jensen, 
1999; Clerides et al. 1998; Delgado et al. 2002). Therefore we would expect exporting 
firms’ investments to be less sensitive to internal funds than their domestic counterparts’.  
However, the existence of fixed costs to enter foreign markets (see Roberts and 
Tybout 1994, Chaney, 2005) implies that only firms that have enough liquidity to finance 
these costs are able to export. If this is the case, then firms that are ex-ante less 
financially constrained may self-select into exporting.   5
 
 The empirical results indicate that Czech exporters are different from the rest of 
domestic firms. Exporters have higher value added, liquidity ratios and cash flow levels. 
The analysis shows that they face less liquidity constraints than non-exporters, even after 
accounting for differences in firm size and the level of external debt. Moreover, we find 
that exporting eases firm liquidity constraints precisely in those sectors that are relatively 
more in need of external financing.
1  Finally, after carefully correcting for possible 
endogeneity as well as for the selection of the less liquidity constrained firms into 
exporting we find no evidence that the exporters are different than non-exporters in terms 
of the sensitivity of their investment to internal funds. Rather, the evidence is consistent 
with unconstrained firms, which have easier time securing financing, self-selecting into 
exporting. The results are in line with the theoretical findings of Chaney (2005), which 
shows that if there are fixed costs associated with exporting only less liquidity 
constrained firms will enter foreign markets. 
 
This study is structured as follows.  The next section discusses financial 
constraints and presents the estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the data and the 
summary statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical specification and the results.  Section 
5 concludes. 
 
Financial Constraints and Estimation Issues 
 
                                                 
1 We use several measures of “external financing dependence” at the industry level, as defined by Rajan 
and Zingales (1996), Beck and Levine (2002), etc.    6
Ever since the influential paper by Fazzari et al. (1988)
 a large number of studies 
have examined the effects of liquidity constraints on investment.
2 These papers 
challenged the neoclassical theory of investment which suggests that the decision to 
invest is driven exclusively by relative prices and that firm’s financial structure is 
irrelevant to investment since external and internal funds are perfect substitutes. Or, as 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show, with perfect capital markets, a firm’s investment 
decision is independent of its financial condition. Fazzari et al. (1988) showed that, if 
there are informational asymmetries, external funds may be more costly and therefore 
provide an imperfect substitute for internal capital. The gap arises to compensate lenders 
for the adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with the borrowers. If this 
is the case, investment should respond positively to increases in internal funds available 
for investment.  
 
The primary way of testing for financial constraints is to estimate an investment 
equation that includes a measure of the expected profitability of the firm along with a 
measure of internal funds, usually proxied by cash flow. If capital markets were perfect, 
investors and lenders would be indifferent between using internal of external capital, thus 
investment should show no sensitivity to internal funds. If, however, cash flow impacts 
investment behavior, firms are deemed as being financially constrained. For these firms it 
is difficult or expensive to obtain external finance, and they invest only if they have 
sufficient internal funds. Investment will be larger, the more cash flow firms have. 
   7
  We therefore estimate the investment accelerator model (see also Gelos and 
Werner 2002, Konings et al. 2003) that links investment to the rate of growth of sales, 
which is the accelerator variable and proxies for short-term changes in the expected 
profitability. Following the previous literature, we also include cash flow in the 
regression in order to capture financial constraints. To examine whether exporters are 
subject to different liquidity constraints than non-exporters we also include the 
interaction of cash flow with an exporter dummy. The estimated equation is: 
 
Iit/Kit-1 = α0 + α1 ΔSit/Sit-1 + α2 l.CFit/Kit-1 + α3 l.CFit/Kit-1* Exporterit + α4 Exporterit +  
+α5 ln(Sizeit) + α6 Debtit/Kit-1 +αi + αt + εit       (1) 
 
where Iit stands for gross investment undertaken by firm i at time t. Kit stands for real 
capital stock and is proxied by deflated tangible fixed assets. Sit represents real sales, and 
CFit is the real cash flow. The cash flow variable is reported in the Amadeus database 
where it is defined as the sum of profit (loss) after taxation, extraordinary profit (loss) and 
depreciation. We use lag of cash flow, as we would expect the investment decision to 
take place after observing the cash flow.  We normalize investment and cash flow 
variables by the capital stock in order to control for the size effect. We deflate sales and 
cash flow by wholesale price deflators specific to 3-digit NACE sectors, obtained from 
the Czech Statistical Office (CSO). Tangible fixed assets were deflated using a deflator 
obtained from the CSO.  Exporterit is a time-varying dummy variable taking the value of 
one if firm i is an exporter at time t  and zero otherwise. It is based on the information 
obtained from the enterprise surveys.   8
 
The coefficient α2 captures the sensitivity of firms’ level investment to internal 
funds. If capital markets were perfect, the  α2 coefficient would equal zero. If however, 
firms are liquidity constrained that is, if the desired investment level is constrained by the 
availability of internal finance, the coefficient should be positive and statistically 
significant. 
 
The goal of our analysis is to examine the link between liquidity and the exporter 
status, thus our coefficient of interest is α3. A priori one would expect that selling in 
different markets would have a stabilizing effect on sales and cash flow compared to 
firms that only sell domestically. More stable cash flows should make it easier to invest 
in long-term durable investment goods. It should also increase the creditworthiness of 
exporters in the eyes of the lending institutions and make it easier for them to obtain 
outside funds, thus easing the liquidity constraints of exporters compared to non-
exporters. Therefore, we would expect exporters to be less dependent on their internal 
cash flow than non-exporters. If that is the case, then α3, the coefficient of the interaction 
term between cash flow and the exporter dummy, should be negative and statistically 
significant.  
  
The estimated equation also includes several firm-specific time-varying factors 
that might influence the level of investment. We control for firm’s size, measured by 
employment and expressed in log form, and the level of the long-term debt normalized by   9
capital stock. The latter variable controls, especially in developing countries, for access to 
external capital. 
 
To control for the unobserved heterogeneity across firms we estimate a model 
using firm fixed effects (αi). We also include year fixed effects (αt) which capture 
aggregate conditions affecting the cost of capital in a particular year, so it is not necessary 
to control for interest rates or tax rates.  
 
There is nevertheless an additional concern. The explanatory variables may not be 
entirely exogenous. Firm investment shocks may be contemporaneously correlated with 
sales and cash flow. In addition, we have to account for the possible self-selection of less 
liquidity constrained firms into exporting.  If there are fixed costs associated with selling 
in foreign markets, and if firms are financially constrained, then only firms with enough 
liquidity will be able to finance those costs. That is, it may be the case that exporting 
firms were better performers and less liquidity constrained even before starting serving 
foreign markets. A problem like this calls for instrumental variables estimation. We rely 
on our unique survey data and use instruments that are best suited to account for 
endogeneity and possible selection bias in estimation. 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The data we use for this study come from two enterprise surveys conducted by the 
Foreign Investment Advisory Services of the World Bank, in the Czech Republic in 2003   10
and 2004. The surveys were conducted by a professional polling company by means of 
face-to-face interviews taking place at respondents’ workplaces. All respondents were 
guaranteed full anonymity. The data was collected for 657 Czech manufacturing firms. 
The focus of the surveys was on manufacturing firms, i.e. firms operating in sectors 15-
36 according to NACE classification. About one fifth of the firms are located in the 
capital city of Prague, while the rest was distributed across all regions in the country.    
 
The data allows us to identify exporting firms, as well as information about the 
duration of the exporting contracts, details regarding company management, ISO 
certifications, etc. The results of the survey were supplemented with financial 
information on interviewed firms, which was taken from the Amadeus database. The 
additional financial information is available for approximately 2/3 of firms in the sample. 
This remarkably rich database comprises detailed firm level information for the period 
1994-2003. After deleting incomplete or inconsistent data and extreme outliers
3 we are 
left with 1725 firm year observations, pertaining to 365 firms, out of which 92 are 
exporters observed both before and after they started exporting. 
 
Table 1 presents exporter premia, calculated following Bernard and Jensen 
(1999). The advantage of using exporter premia, rather than simple statistics, is that they 
account for the sectoral distribution of exporters. To compute the exporter premia we 
regress variables capturing different firm characteristics (age, sales growth, liquidity 
ratio, investment ratio, value added, etc.) on an exporter dummy, industry and year 
dummies. We also account for the size of the firm. The exporter dummy coefficients,   11
which represent the exporter premia are presented in Table 1. Several observations 
emerge: exporters are older, grow faster, and invest more. They also have higher value 
added, higher liquidity ratios and higher cash flow levels.  
 
-- Table 1 about here – 
 
Estimation Results  
 
We estimate equation (1) and present the results in Table 2.  
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
In the first column we report the estimates that capture the direct effect of cash 
flow on firm’s investment decision regardless of the exporter status. The coefficient of 
cash flow is positive and highly statistically significant, indicating that internal funds are 
indeed an important determinant of the investment decision of firms operating in Czech 
Republic. The findings are in line with Konings et al. (2003) and Lizal and Svejnar 
(2002) who find evidence for the existence of liquidity constraints on a sample of Czech 
firms. As expected, the sales growth coefficient is also positive and statistically 
significant. 
  
We next test whether exporters are less credit constrained than the rest of 
domestic firms by interacting the cash flow with a dummy that takes the value 1 if the   12
firm exports during the current year and zero otherwise. The results suggest that being an 
exporter eases domestic firms’ liquidity constraints. The interaction coefficient is 
negative and highly statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient is equal to 
more than a third of the cash flow coefficient suggesting that exporters find it much 
easier to finance their investments than non-exporters. The exporter dummy itself is not 
statistically significant, suggesting that exporters do not differ in their investment 
behavior from other firms.
4  
  
We also account for other variables that might impact exporters’ liquidity 
constraints, like the size of the firm and the volume of debt. While the coefficient of the 
size variable is insignificant, the volume of debt has a positive impact on investments. 
Even with these controls added to the regression, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between cash flow and exporter dummy remains negative and statistically significant.   
 
In order to make sure that the effects we capture are not due to Czech firms being 
exporters throughout the whole period they are in the sample, we re-estimate the above 
regressions and exclude continuous exporters. The results, presented in the last 6 columns 
of Table 2 suggest that indeed the effect we observed so far is due to new exporters, 
which are firms that we observe both before and after they start exporting. They are less 
liquidity constrained than the rest of the Czech firms. 
 
Next, we account for possible macroeconomic shocks, including changes in 
interest rates, which may affect industries differently. We include in the regressions   13
industry-year fixed effects and again exclude firms that were exporters throughout the 
sample period. The results shown in Table 3 confirm the earlier pattern, that exporting 
alleviates investment cash flow sensitivities. 
  
-- Table 3 about here -- 
 
We also drop firms with negative cash flows since, as Fazzari et al.  (2000) point 
out, not accounting for them may introduce a censored regression bias in the estimated 
investment-cash flow sensitivities. Negative cash flows represent situations in which 
investment is at its lowest level, and cannot be reduced any more if cash flows decline. 
We therefore drop the negative cash flow observations and re-estimate the regressions. 
The results are presented in Table 4. The exercise does not affect our results. Exporting 
firms’ investment is less dependent on cash flow than the rest of the manufacturing firms. 
 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
 
Finally, we test whether being an exporter matters more in industries that are 
more dependent on external finance, or that have less collateralizable assets. We thus 
separate industries in those that are “more in need of external finance” and the rest of the 
manufacturing. We use various measures of “external financing dependence”: the 
measure used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) where an industry’s dependence on external 
capital is given by the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations to 
capital expenditures for the median firm in each industry. In their paper, sectors are more   14
in need of external financing if the above ratio is greater than 0.5.  We use the same 
definition here. Beck and Levine (2002) argue that R&D intensity may also lead to higher 
reliance on financial intermediaries. Thus, we calculate a proxy for industry R&D 
intensity as the mean (respectively, median) of intangible assets for all industries in 1995. 
The R&D intensity dummy takes the value 1 if the value of intangibles assets is above the 
mean (median). As yet another measure of dependence on financial sector, we use the 
Czech input output matrix for the year 1995 to calculate an index of sector’s financial 
dependence as the share of inputs of each manufacturing industry that comes from the 
financial sector. We define external finance dependent industries as those for which the 
index is higher than the mean (changing it to the median does not affect the results). The 
results are presented in Table 5. The regressions are run separately for the “financially 
dependent sectors” (defined as above) and for the rest of the manufacturing industries. 
Interestingly, the results suggest that the exporter status matters only for those industries 
that are more in need of external funds. The interaction between the cash flow and the 
exporter dummy is negative and statistically significant in all these regressions. Exporter 
status eases liquidity constraints in precisely those sectors that are more dependent on 
external financing. 
 
-- Table 5 about here -- 
Instrumental Variables approach 
 
The results so far suggest that exporters are different than non-exporters with 
respect to the degree of liquidity constraints. However, a drawback of our estimate thus   15
far is the inability to account for endogeneity in estimation or for selection bias. As stated 
by Hubbard (1998) in order to estimate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow one 
needs to control for the investment opportunities since the firm’s cash position may 
contain information about its investment opportunities. Endogeneity occurs if firms tend 
to accumulate cash when they are unusually profitable. Also, as Chaney (2005) shows in 
his theoretical model, less liquidity constrained firms may self-select into exporting.  In 
order to account for these possible biases we use the system GMM instrumental variables 
approach, proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). We instrument for sales, cash flow, the 
exporter status and their interaction. We make use of the unique survey data and 
instrument for the interaction between cash flow and the possibility of being an exporter 
with the interaction between the second lag of cash flow and the following variables that 
come from the survey: dummies for managers’ proficiency in foreign language 
knowledge, foreign experience, and foreign education, and as well as dummies for firms 
having ISO certifications. The level of proficiency was determined by whether the 
manager is able to conduct business negotiations in this language or able to understand a 
business agreement written in the language. It is likely that firms whose managers have 
foreign education, work experience or speak foreign languages are better positioned to 
establish contacts with foreign customers and thus export. Similarly, having an ISO 
certification may play an important role in getting access to foreign markets. Exporters 
are often required to have ISO certification, and the certification process is quite costly, 
as it usually involves services of specialized consulting firms, that only firms that are less 
liquidity constrained may be able to afford.    16
We also use as instruments the interaction of cash flow with industry level proxies 
for the presence of multinationals in the same industry. The later would account for the 
likelihood that proximity to multinationals may facilitates business relationships; or that 
the knowledge and expertise that foreign firms bring may spill over to domestic firms, 
increase their productivity and competitiveness, thus increasing the likelihood of their 
entry into foreign markets. The proxy for the presence of foreign firms in the same sector 
is calculated as the share of foreign output in total industry output. It is calculated by 
weighting the output of each firm in sector k (Yft) by the share of the firm’s equity owned 
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We again exclude from the regressions firms that are continuous exporters 
throughout the duration of our sample. Based on the reported specification tests listed in 
Table 6 we conclude that our instruments are reasonable predictors of the endogeneous 
variables. The Hansen test for overidentification shows that one cannot reject the null at 
conventional significance levels. The Arellano-Bond test shows that one cannot reject the 
null of no second-order serial correlation.  
-- Table 6 about here -- 
 
We find that the exporter status does not have a significant impact on firm’s 
liquidity constraints once endogeneity and selection are taken into account. In none of the   17
regressions is the interaction term between cash flow and the exporter status statistically 
significant.  
Therefore, once we account for the possible endogeneity of the less liquidity 
constraints firms into exporting, we find no evidence that the exporting status eases 
firms’ liquidity constraints. Rather, the results suggest that less liquidity constrained 




This paper uses a unique data set from the Czech Republic to study the link 
between financial constraints and exporting status. We find that exporters are less 
liquidity constrained than the rest of the Czech firms. The effect is present in the full 
sample of exporters and remains after we drop continuous exporters and focus on new 
exporters only.   Moreover, we find that exporting eases firms’ liquidity constraints 
precisely in those sectors that are relatively in more need of external financing. The effect 
is present even after accounting for firm size and debt, which may impact firms’ access to 
external credit.  
 
The empirical finding that exporters are less liquidity constrained could be 
explained by two hypotheses: that exporting decreases the financial constraints of 
previously constrained firms, or, alternatively, that unconstrained firms self-select into 
exporting. After carefully correcting for possible endogeneity and selection issues we 
find evidence in favor of the second hypothesis. The results are in line with the   18
theoretical paper by Chaney (2005), which shows that only firms that ex-ante have 
sufficient liquidity will export. 
 
These findings have policy implications. The analysis suggests that easing firms’ 
credit constraints may play an important role in facilitating exporting and that well-
developed financial markets that would decrease firms’ cost of external finance may be 
needed in order to take full advantage of the benefits associated with selling in foreign 
markets. 
   19
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Table 1.  Exporter Premia – Czech firms, starters only 
  
   
  with control for firm size (%) 
Age  92.5 
Sales growth  5.2 
Cash Flow  25.9 
Liquidity ratio  3.10 
Leverage ratio  n.s. 
Gross Investment  32.8 
Value added   12.5 
Long term debt/Total assets  n.s. 
   
The premia are the coefficients of the Exporter dummy in the following regressions: 
 ln Xit =  +  Exporterit +  ln Employmentit + j +t + it 
where j stands for industry and t for year fixed effects.  
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Table 2. Fixed Effects Regressions 
                          
     All Suppliers           Excluding continuous suppliers 
                          
Sales 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.171*** 0.171***  0.137**  0.142**  0.146**  0.139** 
[0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034]  [0.059] [0.059]  [0.059]  [0.059] 
l.CF_k  0.239***  0.334***  0.337***  0.339*** 0.235***  0.324*** 0.327***  0.329*** 
[0.025] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054]  [0.043] [0.060]  [0.061]  [0.060] 
 
l.CF_k*Exporter  -0.118** -0.122** -0.120**  -0.156** -0.160**  -0.162** 
[0.059] [0.059] [0.058]  [0.075] [0.075]  [0.075] 
 
Exporter -0.031  -0.029  -0.028 -0.003  -0.003  -0.006 
[0.076] [0.076] [0.076]  [0.088] [0.088]  [0.088] 
Size 0.021  0.019 
[0.031] [0.042] 
Debt_k 0.333***  0.408* 
[0.108] [0.215] 
Constant 0.105***  0.130*  0.043  0.098  0.051 0.055  -0.032  0.038 
[0.026] [0.067] [0.181] [0.067]  [0.076] [0.090]  [0.222]  [0.090] 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 1725  1725  1719  1725 697  697  695  697 
Number of firms  365  365  365  365  164  164  164  164 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.08 0.09  0.09  0.09 
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Table 3. Accounting for industry*year effect
        
        
Sales  0.139** 0.144** 0.146** 0.141** 0.143** 
 [0.059]  [0.059]  [0.059] [0.059] [0.059] 
l.CF_k  0.220*** 0.306*** 0.307*** 0.311*** 0.313*** 
 [0.043]  [0.061]  [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] 
 
l.CF_k*Exporter  -0.149** -0.151** -0.154** -0.156** 
   [0.075] [0.075] [0.075] [0.075] 
 
Exporter   0.001  0.001  -0.003  -0.003 
    [0.088] [0.088] [0.087] [0.088] 
Size     0.011    0.01 
     [0.042]  [0.042] 
Debt_k     0.365*  0.365* 
       [0.215]  [0.215] 
       
Industry*year  -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
       
Constant  153.977** 148.242** 148.376** 139.093** 138.636** 
  [61.196] [61.136] [62.516] [61.261] [62.666] 
       
Observations  697 697 695 697 695 
Number  of  firms  164 164 164 164 164 
R-squared  0.09  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
      
Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Excluding firms with negative cash flow     
        
        
Sales  0.167**  0.174*** 0.177*** 0.172*** 0.176*** 
  [0.066] [0.066] [0.066] [0.066] [0.066] 
l.CF_k  0.306*** 0.388*** 0.390*** 0.391*** 0.394*** 
  [0.048] [0.067] [0.067] [0.067] [0.067] 
       
l.CF_k*Exporter  -0.148* -0.150* -0.151* -0.153* 
   [0.083] [0.084] [0.083] [0.084] 
 
Exporter    0.012 0.011 0.009 0.008 
    [0.096] [0.097] [0.096] [0.096] 
Size     0.01    0.011 
     [0.046]  [0.046] 
Debt_k     0.271  0.274 
       [0.232]  [0.232] 
 
Constant  0.007  0.003 -0.039 -0.008 -0.054 
  [0.082] [0.097] [0.242] [0.097] [0.242] 
 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Observations 615  615  613  615  613 
Number of firms  160  160  160  160  160 
R-squared  0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
       
Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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dependent    
Financially 
dependent    
Financially 
dependent    
Financially 
dependent    
Financially 
dependent    
  sectors    sectors    sectors   sectors  sectors  
Sales 0.014  0.202***  0.193*  0.06  0.247***  0.037  -0.273  0.218***  0.003  0.317*** 
  [0.189] [0.058] [0.109] [0.066] [0.085]  [0.083] [0.224] [0.054] [0.083] [0.088] 
l.CF_k  0.766*** 0.174*** 0.450***  0.128*  0.228***  0.462***  2.311***  0.218***  1.430***  0.301*** 
  [0.221] [0.058] [0.114] [0.068] [0.071]  [0.109] [0.417] [0.052] [0.190] [0.073] 
 
l.CF_k*Exporter  -0.489**  -0.006  -0.317**  0.128  -0.164*  -0.154  -1.868***  -0.071  -1.318***  -0.072 
  [0.231]  [0.076]  [0.130]  [0.095]  [0.087]  [0.137]  [0.509]  [0.065]  [0.221]  [0.087] 
 
Exporter  0.421 -0.067 0.154 -0.078 -0.134  0.099  0.263  -0.061  0.223*  -0.077 
  [0.316] [0.080] [0.199] [0.080] [0.117]  [0.131] [0.286] [0.086] [0.128] [0.127] 
Size  0.072 0.029 0.034 0.018 -0.025  0.042  0.148  0.01  0.025  0.003 
  [0.183] [0.037] [0.106] [0.036] [0.062]  [0.058] [0.224] [0.037] [0.064] [0.057] 
Debt_k  -0.173 0.539*** -0.241 0.735*** 0.508  0.381 0.644  0.540***  -0.012  0.967*** 
  [1.171] [0.182] [0.497] [0.193] [0.357]  [0.274] [0.884] [0.199] [0.336] [0.308] 
                 
Constant -0.494  -0.01  -0.195  0.009  0.283 -0.292  -0.785  0.043  -0.07  0.074 
  [0.843] [0.194] [0.514] [0.192] [0.294]  [0.303] [1.393] [0.193] [0.366] [0.262] 
                 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
                 
Observations  118 577 263 432 292  403  110  585  346  349 
Number  of  firms  28  136  65 99 73  91  37  144  103  106 
R-squared  0.2  0.1  0.13 0.13 0.12  0.13  0.46  0.1  0.26  0.17 
               
Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6. Instrumental Variables regressions 
                 
l.I_k 0.028  0.049  0.051  0.027  0.043 
[0.097] [0.106] [0.105] [0.095] [0.100] 
Sales 0.149*  0.146*  0.148*  0.149*  0.149* 
[0.079] [0.085] [0.083] [0.079] [0.080] 
l.CF_k 0.343***  0.348***  0.339***  0.351***  0.341*** 
[0.126] [0.125] [0.119] [0.121] [0.122] 
l.CF_k*Exporter -0.149  -0.155 -0.149 -0.160  -0.165 
[0.170] [0.182] [0.173] [0.169] [0.175] 
Exporter 0.273*  0.406**  0.407**  0.310**  0.369** 
[0.141] [0.162] [0.158] [0.125] [0.145] 
Size -0.058  -0.073  -0.056  -0.049  -0.045 
[0.042] [0.047] [0.051] [0.040] [0.049] 
Debt_k 0.690***  0.692**  0.678**  0.668**  0.731*** 
[0.245] [0.312] [0.289] [0.263] [0.266] 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 528  528  528  528  528 






















 l2.(CF_k l2.(CF_k 
*Horizontal) 




value 0.69  0.72  0.74  0.68  0.69 
Hansen J statistic   0.47  0.40  0.45  0.55  0.48 
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
1 Amadeus  is a commercial database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. 
2 See Hubbard (1998) for an excellent review of the literature. 
3 Negative values of tangible fixed assets, sales, depreciation were replaced with missing. We also dropped 
the 1% tails of the following variables: sales growth, tangible fixed assets growth and CF_K1 from the 
sample. 
4 Some differences may be captured by the firm fixed effects included in the model. 